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Columbia University’s Data Science Institute Presents:
DATA SCIENCE DAY

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Wednesday, April 6 • 2:00pm - 4:30pm
Central Clearing: On the Regulation of Collateral Requirements [P25]

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Clearinghouses operate in a highly regulated environment. Collateral requirements are subject to regulatory approval, and are critically reviewed, since collateral is viewed as the first line of protection for the systemi-cally important clearinghouse in the event of a client default. This does not, however, take away entirely the freedom of the clearinghouse to choose her preferred collat-eralization rules. Regulators often require portfolios to be “fully collateralized,” which effectively creates a floor on the level of collateral a clearinghouse can demand. Since collateral, essentially a contingent claim that pays off only when there is a default, protects clearinghouses from counterparty risk, one may argue that it may be incentive compatible for the clearinghouse to impose even higher requirements. Regulatory authorities thus need to understand the incentives of the clearinghouse, so to design policies that align the interests of the clearinghouse with those of the regulator. We design an extensive form game where the profit maximizing clearinghouse clears client trades submitted via a clearing member bank, in the absence of a regulator. We analytically characterize all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show that the resulting equilibrium can only involve very low or very high collateral levels, depending on the riskiness of the traded contract and the benefits that clients can capture from trading. When equilibrium collateral levels are high, the introduction of a regulatory constraint would have no effect since the clearinghouse would have chosen high collateral requirements anyway; when equilibrium collateral levels are low, regulations are necessary to protect the clearinghouse from default losses in bad states of nature.

Demo/Poster Presenter
avatar for W. Allen Cheng

W. Allen Cheng

PhD Candidate in Industrial Engineering and Operations Reasearch, Columbia Engineering
Wan-Schwin Allen Cheng (1988 --) is a Taiwanese-American born in Buffalo, New York. He graduated from National Taiwan University in 2010 with honors, majoring in Mathematics. After fulfilling his Taiwanese military duties, he worked as a research assistant at Academia Sinica. He then proceeded to earn his masters in science and engineering in Applied Mathematics and Statistics in 2013 from the Johns Hopkins University. He was supported by... Read More →

Demo/Poster Collaborator
avatar for Agostino Capponi

Agostino Capponi

Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia Engineering
Agostino Capponi joined Columbia University's IEOR Department in August 2014, where he is also a member of the Data Science Institute. His main research interests are in the area of networks, with a special focus on systemic risk, contagion, and control. In the context of financial networks, the outcome of his research contributes to a better understanding of risk management practices, and to assess the impact of regulatory policies aimed... Read More →


Wednesday April 6, 2016 2:00pm - 4:30pm
Roone Arledge Auditorium Lerner Hall, Columbia University 2920 Broadway, New York, NY 10040